AI, the Challenge of Mass Prosperity, and Global Disorder - Transcript of GZERO world interview by President Tharman Shanmugaratnam in Davos, Switzerland on 21 January 2026

Ian Bremmer, President and Founder of GZERO media, Eurasia Group: President Tharman Shanmugaratnam, it's so nice to see you again.

President Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Wonderful to see you, Ian.

Ian Bremmer: This is not our first rodeo here, but it does feel like it's the most uncertain, the most disruptive. Would you agree with that?

President Tharman: We are at a moment in history where the old verities are past us, but we don't know where we're heading.

In other words, this is not a transition to some new world order. It's certainly not a transition to multipolarity, which suggests some semblance of balance or of shared responsibility. We are not anywhere close to that. All we have is that we're no longer in a world where a single dominant power oversaw global security, open global markets and global public goods.

What we do have, very salient, is uncertainty — radical uncertainty. We have fluidity in international affairs, transactions occurring by the day, and we keep waiting for the next hotspot. So that's where we are at.

But it means the task for countries, small, medium, and large, is not to sit back, not to be dispirited, but to now construct a decent world order: where you have a framework of rules that still respects sovereignty, and that allows us to address the common issues that all countries are self-interested in. Major issues. Not merely issues that attract globalists, but attract every country in its own interests, where the ability to collaborate on those issues is going to be critical to satisfy the wellbeing of our own people. We must construct multiple alliances, coalitions of the willing, that enable us to address each of these issues.

Ian Bremmer: Now, I agree with everything you just said in the sense that we have enormous uncertainty, that so many countries, so many people around the world want something that feels like a rules-based order, and it needs to be constructed, essentially.

But of course, at the same time, we have the United States, which is driving the disruption. Not just by saying it doesn't want to play the global leadership role, but actually undermining a lot of the rules that otherwise a country like Singapore would like, whether it's the geopolitical actions in Venezuela or Greenland, or it's the economic actions in terms of the tariffs and the interventions.

China's been doing that, maybe not as suddenly, but we've seen that in the South China Sea. We've seen it in Taiwan. We've also seen it in terms of state capitalism. So add that to your equation, what the Americans and the Chinese are doing.

President Tharman: The vast majority of countries, partly as a consequence of the decades of multilateralism that we've had, believe in the international rule of law, believe in open markets, and believe that there's something in climate change and global health and the new risks of AI where cooperation will leave us all better off. The vast majority of countries believe in that, and they are moving.

Ian Bremmer: So you're saying the vast majority, but not the most powerful. That's the bit that I'm not hearing.

President Tharman: That is true, for now, yes.

The vast majority also now – and this may be a blessing coming out of the current state of disorder – are now moving a lot faster to develop new alliances, new coalitions, in ways that we would not have expected five years ago. There was so much inertia in the system. And that's now dissipating precisely because everyone is now having to sit up and realise that we have to exercise agency.

And we exercise agency amongst small and medium-sized countries, and some large countries. Most of the problems in the world require enough of a solid core of countries – comprising enough of world trade, enough of world carbon emissions, enough of world expertise and technological innovation – so as to be able to provide a new foundation for some form of multilateralism that will no longer be singular, will probably be multiple and organised by domain.

Ian Bremmer: So you'd surely put the EU-Mercosur deal in that category.

President Tharman: It's a good example, because how long were they working on it?

Ian Bremmer: Decades.

President Tharman: Decades — probably 30 years. It got going very quickly after April 2 (2025). The CPTPP is now talking to the EU. It'll take some time, but these are serious conversations. ASEAN is also in discussions with CPTPP.

That’s in trade, but it’s needed in other areas too, in global health, on everything to do with the climate. And in the area where we are least prepared — developing global governance of AI, so as to maximise and unleash the gains that it's potentially capable of creating for countries, whilst guarding against its worst risks, which is going to be critical.

Ian Bremmer: Yeah, I want to get to that. But before we get to AI, you mentioned we've got these areas. You mentioned a number of them, compelling areas where we're seeing all sorts of additional trade rules of the road and economic rules of the road, because there are lots of countries that together are meaningful in being able to construct that.

If I look at security, I see much less of that. Because the global economy looks like a global order that has a whole bunch of countries that are really relevant. I don't see that in the security space.

Are you necessarily much more pessimistic in the ability to create governance and collective security in that environment, given the consolidation of power around a much smaller number of countries that aren't necessarily as willing to hedge the way that you are suggesting?

President Tharman: I think the key will be the US and China. Europe has already shifted its posture on security as a matter of necessity.

Ian Bremmer: Towards Ukraine, you mean?

President Tharman: Ukraine, as well as some other potential new threats. The US and China are absolutely critical, and they're critical both in traditional security concerns like nuclear warfare and on AI-driven warfare.

I think it is possible for the US and China to come to some form of understanding where they will continue to be rivalrous, continue to be intense rivals in the economic sphere, including in AI, whilst exercising restraint in others and even collaborating in some fields — because it'll be in their common interests.

Most obviously, to take the example you've given, both the US and China want to rule out AI-driven nuclear warfare.

Ian Bremmer: The one area that they've actually spoken together on AI.

President Tharman: Yeah, that’s right. They can also move further in AI to rule out some of its worst dangers in other areas.

It will involve a shift in mindset, both amongst the leading private-sector players as well as governments, around thinking about who's going to “win the AI race”. There is no one AI race. There are several AI races. There's foundational research, there's AI implementation in a whole set of different domains, from healthcare to robotics and factories, to many other areas. There is the dissemination of standards globally, which gets countries to buy into your AI stack versus someone else's. There's a whole set of races, and it is most unlikely that either the US or China is going to win an entire “AI race”.

And that should lean towards a framework in which they continue to compete, but they also find ways in which you can get win-win. You can get collaboration in AI that spreads the solutions that are being used in some areas, such as drug discovery, spreads them as widely as possible at a low cost, rather than develop AI stacks that are separate from each other.

It's a classic case of the benefits of interdependence, but now magnified quite greatly in the era of AI.

Ian Bremmer: So do you think that on AI governance and collaboration, it's the biggest challenge right now? That it's just too fast-moving? It’s the biggest challenge that the companies are making so much money, and they've captured the regulatory process, that the governments are incapable of even starting to consider it?

Is it the lack of trust between the US and China that's disentangled the researchers from talking to each other, working for each other? How do you order the challenges? Because I completely agree with you that it's the hardest area right now that's most essential to get cooperation.

President Tharman: I think you summarised it well. It is quite different from the remarkable pacts that were arrived at during the Cold War, between the US and the Soviet Union. It's quite different from nuclear arms control. First, because AI is not being developed or monopolised by states, but by the private sector.

It's moving very fast, much faster than states are capable of comprehending. And also, the fact that while you can count nuclear warheads, it's much more difficult to count algorithms and the many-fold effects of algorithms.

But I think if we are realistic about what we are seeking, realistic in wanting to guard only against the worst that AI could bring, something can be achieved.

We gave the example of nuclear war and making sure that AI is not in control. But in many other areas: the risks of runaway misinformation, the risks of cyber warfare by non-state actors, there's common interest.

There's enough common interest to rule out the worst while you compete over the best,

And I would just say that whilst the US and China are critical in this, small and medium-sized countries are part of the game.

I’ll give you an example. We hosted a conference in Singapore last year (Singapore Conference on AI: International Scientific Exchange). It brought in hundreds of scientists, including many of the best minds from both the US and China. It's unfortunately no longer easy to do that between the two countries, but it's a role that small, neutral countries like Singapore can play.

Ian Bremmer: So you're saying, as you were putting this together, you're telling me that behind the scenes there wasn't any real pushback or consternation? From neither Beijing nor Washington?

President Tharman: Not at all.

Ian Bremmer: That's meaningful.

President Tharman: So I think there's a role that we can play. There's a role that the Europeans play — it has leverage because it's a major consumer, a major market for AI. It's not just the countries or the companies that are doing the foundational research and building the most powerful LLMs that must be left to dictate the directions.

The world at large has to see global cooperation as not just being led by a single player or a major power. They've got to be at the table, but we all contribute and we all act in some way to make sure that guardrails are in place. Sometimes it is the more vulnerable countries that are the first to want to institute guardrails, and the major powers eventually come on board.

Ian Bremmer: Tharman, one of my favourite quotes is from William Gibson. The author says, “The future’s already here, but it’s not evenly distributed.”

We talk about AI. Singapore has been one of the most technology-forward countries in the world: advanced industrial economy, six million people-ish, 60 percent diffusion of AI. How do we, if we look at Singapore as near future in that regard, how do you experience AI differently in your country than a lot of other countries do? What are you already seeing happening in the way the government works and the way society functions?

President Tharman: Every firm, city or economy that's more exposed to AI is going to face the challenge soonest.

We will face the challenge faster than many developing countries which don't have the basic digital infrastructure — which is going to be a problem for them because they're not going to be able to take advantage of AI as much. But we face the challenge quicker.

Our advantage in Singapore, however, is that we've always faced the challenge faster than other countries, because we are small, we are very open, and we rely on technology as a source of competitiveness. We look at AI like every other form of productivity improvement — as a plus. And the real challenge is that we want that plus to be distributed up and down the workforce. That’s going to be a challenge everywhere in the world, and it's not obvious that we are going to succeed.

It requires very active public-private partnership. We always knew that when it comes to the continuous upgrading of skills, but it's going to be much more of a priority in future, because this time around we're talking about investing in a large middle layer of the workforce, white-collar workers, so that they can work with AI or find roles complementary to AI, or to meet growing demands in healthcare and a whole range of new areas.

I think we can do that well in Singapore because it's just part of our economic psyche.

Ian Bremmer: But are you starting to already prepare for that from a policy perspective?

President Tharman: We started some time ago because it's already been a habit in Singapore to anticipate challenges and not wait for them to come upon you before you start reacting.

We have SkillsFuture, which is a major national movement which the government puts some resources into, to ensure we invest at periodic intervals through a person's life. And it's going to be more important than ever before.

We should think about this not just as a threat from a new technology, but as a positive challenge: how do we maximise human capital, how do we build up people’s capabilities so as to achieve mass flourishing, of a whole society?

If we build up people's capabilities, something works out. It works out for them, and it works out for your whole economy.

So focus on capabilities, even if not by way of traditional industrial policy, or trying to predict the future and get an exact matching of demand and supply to meet it.

Ian Bremmer: If we look forward in five years, is the Singaporean government going to be as powerful in Singapore, or are private sector companies going to be a lot more influential?

President Tharman: Our whole model of economic policy in Singapore was quite different from the traditional model in Northeast Asia, for instance. It was always a model of watching the market, talking to companies, local and foreign, finding out what their plans were for the future, and then saying, “Let’s try and create an ecosystem to make this happen faster and make sure that workers can benefit.”

So we were always involved in ecosystem building. That's what the government was about. It was never about government versus private enterprise. It was about creating ecosystems where private enterprise can do well for itself, but most importantly, where our people can be part of the prosperity.

Ian Bremmer: President Tharman Shanmugaratnam, it's always good to see you. Thank you.

President Tharman: Thank you.