Will the world ever get to a multipolar order? Four propositions to consider

No one can tell where the geopolitical disorder of our times, coupled with the exponential growth of artificial intelligence (AI)’s benefits and dangers, will take us.

We have to reorient ourselves for this world of radical uncertainty and find new ways for countries to work together in their mutual interests. Let me make four propositions.

First, the US-led, unipolar world is past, but we have not arrived at a multipolar order.

The US is still the preeminent power — militarily, economically, and technologically. But Pax Americana rested not on power, but on influence and legitimacy. The majority of nations were persuaded to align themselves with the rules and norms of a global order designed under US leadership, believing it was in their national interests.

To be sure, it was a cooperative order that served America’s interests. The US paid large dues to keep the system going, but it reaped much larger dividends through its economy, its financial system, and the many benefits of soft power.

What has changed is the shift in the US from the practice of enlightened self-interest, to a more immediate calculation of national interests. As a result, US influence has waned — as seen consistently in surveys of public opinion in Europe, Asia and around the world.

But a multipolar order is not yet reality. There may be more poles, but global leadership has thinned. Lacking too is the capacity for collective action to address the challenges that nations big and small face: in tackling climate change, preventing the next pandemic, building the guardrails to allow AI to progress without disaster, and securing peace. Nor is there any assurance of eventually arriving at a system that enables nations to achieve economic security without mutually-defeating actions to restrict each other’s access in trade and technology. 

If anything, we are more likely than not to see growing suspicion, conflicts, the continuing weaponisation of chokepoints in global supply chains, and a slow descent into a world of divided blocs.

A time for bridge powers

My second proposition, therefore, is that we will not arrive at a multipolar order by falling in love with the destination, but by working on the journey.

This requires states that can act as bridge builders — those who can work with others to connect regions, find common ground between the Global South and Global North, construct coalitions for bolder actions on the climate and the other urgent challenges of the global commons.

This also requires bridge builders between the leading superpowers themselves — the nations who can help preserve economic networks that are integral to both the US and China. We must maintain overlapping networks, the supply chains that include both the US and China, and avoid as much as we can the drift towards bifurcation.

We also need bridge builders to construct the plurilateral coalitions that can lay the groundwork for a new, reformed multilateralism: suitable for an era no longer dominated by one power as it was at the time of the Bretton Woods Agreement. It is also an era where digital trade and AI, governed well, can play a major role in spreading prosperity globally.

What’s already clear is that these bridge builders come from nations large and small. Canada and the European Union (EU), both large players, are working actively to build links between the EU and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) which could eventually create the largest plurilateral coalition in support of freer trade. Australia is another active bridge builder. It was instrumental in forming APEC, and together with Japan, managed to resuscitate the TPP and make it a reality after the US dropped out.

Yet several smaller nations are serving as bridge builders too. Sweden has been building coalitions to support the health of the planet, starting more than half a century ago. The Nordic countries are also partnering Africa in making its green transition, in ways that support economic development.

Singapore, by no means a middle power, initiated the first Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, co-convened the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on E-Commerce aimed at developing the first set of global rules on digital trade, and is working to keep the voices of small states heard at the United Nations and elsewhere. It is also among the states actively seeking to align the CPTPP and EU. Ghana, another relatively small economy, has built a new coalition to support reforms in global health, through the Accra Reset initiative.

Calling US and China

My third proposition, however, is that no system of world order will be possible without integral roles for both the US and China. They have the largest markets. They are the largest sources of innovation, and have the overwhelming share of global AI compute. And they are essential to tackling climate change, together accounting for over 40% of greenhouse gas emissions, while China has emerged a leading source of green technologies.

It may seem odd to expect this role from the US, given the shift in political mood in the country towards China over the last decade, and in more recent years towards international cooperation in general. But the US is never unchanging. Its direction is determined not only by whether the Republicans or Democrats win elections but by the body politic.

Reliable polls show that the majority of Americans support global cooperation. In fact, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 2026 survey found that two thirds of Americans favour global cooperation, even if it means some compromise to their nation’s interests. In fact, the true surprise is that a higher proportion of Americans hold that belief than in most other developed countries.

We cannot expect the US to retrace its steps and take on the full responsibilities it assumed under Pax Americana. But neither should we assume that America stays away from global governance, particularly where it is clear that it can better achieve its interests through international cooperation.

However, the precondition for a stable global order is a set of rules of the game between the US and China.

There is no precedent for what we have today: two leading powers who are nearly peers in economic competition, and closely interdependent, a situation different in both regards from the contest between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.

How the US and China manage their strategic competition will determine if we achieve global stability. Three elements will help us get there.

First, the US and China have to view interdependence and competition not a threat to be eliminated, but a relationship to be managed. It is a mistake to think that the US can hold China down permanently. China has already moved ahead of the US in certain sectors, such as digital infrastructure, solar and battery technologies, and EVs. Nor will it be possible to prevent China from developing advanced capabilities in areas where the US may retain a lead for some time, such as in frontier chips.

Equally, neither the US or China will see any lasting gain in economic security through an escalation of restrictions on each other’s access to critical technologies, materials or scientific talent — as each country’s action invites retaliation from the other. The world will surely also become more dangerous for all if it moves towards a decoupling of the two countries’ AI and technology ecosystems.

Second, it helps to recognise that there is no finishing line in the AI race. There is no point at which we will be able to say that the US or China has won decisively and permanently. Equally, the potential dangers to us all will only grow without cooperation to regulate AI. These dangers will arise not only from poorly-trained or rogue AI agents, but from rogue human actors using untraceable open-source AI models. AI has, if anything, reduced the gap in threat abilities between large, organised actors and lone wolves. No country can deal with these threats of AI-generated cyber, biological or chemical weapons on its own.

Third, the US and China have to recognise that, given their scale, their domestic imbalances have significant international consequences. The US cannot keep deferring action to reduce its record-high fiscal deficit. The repercussions of its growing deficit will be felt both domestically and globally. They introduce new risks to financial stability. And a bond market response that pushes interest rates higher will impose costs on economies around the world, many of which are already facing strain.

China, on its part, will have to recognise that to be the largest supplier of goods to the world, it will have to be a larger source of demand than it is currently. The claim that China’s industrial subsidies account for its large share of global manufactured exports is overstated. However, it is in both China’s interests and the rest of the world’s that it succeeds in its efforts to reduce its domestic imbalances. It may take time to sustain higher household consumption, given the complex factors behind it. In the meantime, China’s temporary management of exports in specific sectors – such as in its recent agreement with the EU on hybrid vehicles – and more importantly, its greater foreign direct investment and technology transfers abroad, will contribute to a more stable economic order.

Social compacts: look back to go forward

My fourth proposition is that countries cannot create a new, open and cooperative international order without new social compacts at home.

Gaps in social inclusion remain a common feature in the developing world. In the most advanced nations, the social compact has now worn thin, and public morale worn down. Ageing societies will add to the stress, as the fiscal pressures these nations face will pit young against old.

The solution cannot simply be fiscal austerity. It must involve a basic redesign of fiscal and social compacts, so as to not only put fiscal balances on a sustainable path but enthuse people in a shared future.

To go forward, it may help to take a leaf from the past. The practice of social democracy in its early years was in fact quite different from today’s welfare state. It was not centred on the large-scale redistribution of benefits to individuals, but chiefly involved investing for the common good: in public schools and health systems, public transport systems, libraries and other amenities that benefited everyone. It was similarly about collective insurance rather than transfers: people paid in during their working years, and drew out in sickness and or when they reached an old age.

Some redistribution was always necessary to mitigate inequality. But the larger idea, of sharing in good quality public services and social insurance, was in itself a progressive scheme, because the people who benefitted most were ordinary folk and the poor. It also had an uplifting tone, because everyone was pitching in, and everyone felt they were sharing in security and life’s opportunities. The Swedes called this the idea of a shared home.

Reinvesting in public services, and in opportunities for inclusion, remains a central demand in every democracy, as the troubles in Europe make apparent — from schools with good teachers and even proper toilets, to urban social planning that does not segregate the poor.

More than ever too, the common good will demand investments in learning and skilling through life. Even as AI and related technological changes offer the promise of society prospering as a whole, a significant number will be at risk of losing out.

Those who lose matter, even if more people gain. We must avoid, at all costs, a K-shaped economy and wider divergences in society as we move into the AI era. 

*This is an abridged version of a lecture delivered by President Tharman Shanmugaratnam at the Stockholm School of Economics 20 October 2026. The article was published in The Straits Times on 7 November 2026. (opens in new tab)